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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is vested in this Court pursuant to § 78-2-
2(3)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court rule correctly in denying 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial? 
2. Did the district court rule correctly in allowing the 
admission of jury instruction number 10? 
3. Did the district court rule correctly in excluding the 
investigating officer's testimony as to the cause of the subject 
accident? 
4. Did the district court rule correctly in allowing the use 
of Donald Kennedy's prior inconsistent statement for impeachment? 
5. Is this a frivolous appeal entitling defendant to double 
costs and reasonable attorney's fees? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As a general proposition "It is the exclusive province of the 
jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the 
evidence, and make findings of fact. (Cites omitted). Where the 
evidence is conflicting and the jury is properly instructed, we do 
not upset those findings of fact on appeal except upon a showing 
that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, so clearly preponderated in appellant's favor that 
reasonable persons could not differ on the outcome of the case. 
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc. . 667 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1983). See also 
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Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991). 
1. As to issue number 1: " . . . [A]n insufficiency -of-the 
evidence based challenge to a denial of [a motion for a new trial] 
is governed by one standard of review: "We reverse only if, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who 
prevailed, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support 
the verdict." Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). 
2. As to issue number 2: . . . "[A]n improper jury 
instruction is grounds for "reversible error 'if it tends to 
mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party7". 
Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Ut. App. 1991) see also 
Steele v. Breinholt. 747 P.2d 433, 435 (Ut. App. 1987). 
3. As to issue number 3; "The trial court has discretion to 
determine the admissibility of expert testimony, and to determine 
if the witness is qualified to give an opinion on a particular 
matter. (Cites omitted.) Such a ruling will not be reversed 
unless the trial court abused its discretion in excluding expert 
testimony, and, even then, only if the appellant can show the 
' excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence 
in bringing about a different verdict.7" . . . Anton v. Thomas, 
806 P.2d 744, 746 (Ut. App. 1991). 
4. As to issue number 4: . . . " In reviewing questions of 
admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given to the trial 
court's advantageous position; thus, that court's rulings regarding 
admissibility will not be overturned "unless it clearly appears 
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that the lower court was in error." Whitehead v. American Motors 
Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990). 
5. As to issue number 5; "If a court shall determine that a 
motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous 
or for delay, it shall award just damages and single or double 
costs, including reasonable attorneys fees, to the prevailing 
party." Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Defendant cited the following (attached as Exhibit 2) : (1) 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-49; (2) Utah Code Ann. §41-6-55; (3) Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33; (4) Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Rule 34; (5) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 
40; (6) Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702; (7) Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 704; 8. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801. 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict entered in favor of 
defendant Warren Yarnell in the Second Judicial District Court in 
and for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde 
presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. An automobile accident occurred on April 6, 1987, 
involving plaintiff Tina Noonan (Noonan) and defendant Warren 
Yarnell (Yarnell). Said accident occurred at approximately 923 
South and 1900 West, Ogden, Utah. (R.l) 
2. Mr. Yarnell was traveling north on 1900 West, a two lane 
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road, one lane heading northbound and one lane heading southbound. 
At the intersection of 1900 West and 12th South there is a stop 
light and a left turn lane. (T.54 lines 11-13, 25; T.63 lines 12-
16; T.129 lines 6-10; T.130 lines 9-12.) 
3. Ms. Noonan was proceeding north on 1900 West ahead of Mr. 
Yarnell. When Ms. Noonan reached the intersection of 1900 West and 
12th South she realized she had missed her turn. Her thought was 
to make a U-turn. She looked in her rearview mirror and realized 
traffic was coming behind her and decided to go through the 
intersection, "find a piece of shoulder up further where I could 
turn off of the road and make a U-turn to the left." (T.42 lines 
14-25, T.54 lines 3-7.) 
4. It was her testimony she decided to go down the road where 
she saw a farmhouse on the westside of the road and then make her 
U-turn. (T.43 lines 5-10; T.44 lines 8-19; T.55 lines 10-13.) 
5. Ms. Noonan proceeded through the intersection, saw Mr. 
Yarnell behind her and decided to turn onto the shoulder to make a 
U-turn. (T.59 lines 1-11; T.57 lines 1-15; T.58 lines 15-20.) 
6. Ms. Noonan testified that she did not put her turn signal 
on until she went through the intersection because her "intent was 
to let [Yarnell] know well in advance that I intended to make a 
left turn and move out of that lane of traffic." In fact she 
testified she gave Mr. Yarnell sufficient notice. (T.44 lines 22-
25; T.45 lines 1-2; T.46 lines 19-25; T.47 line 1.) 
7. Her statement taken at the time of the accident 
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contradicts her trial testimony. Her statement specifically 
stated: 
"I was northbound on 1900 West and preparing 
to make a left turn to turn around as I had 
missed my turn. When I saw the vehicle behind 
me was coming up on my back quickly I turned 
my left turn signal on to make sure he knew I 
was turning. . . . " (Plaintiff's Trial 
Exhibit I). 
8. Just prior to making her U-turn she looked into the rear-
view mirror again and decided she could not make the U-turn from 
the left side of the street because Mr. Yarnell was approaching her 
too fast. (T.60 lines 11-25; T.61 line 1.) 
9. Ms. Noonan then made another split second decision to pull 
onto the shoulder. In fact she testified she really didn't know 
what she was going to do. (T.60 lines 24-25; T.61 lines 1-7; T.67 
lines 5-11.) 
10. Ms. Noonan testified that when she turned on her left 
turn signal it was her intent to turn into a driveway in front of 
a farmhouse. (T.62 lines 1-4.) 
11. The point of impact was some 76 feet from the farmhouse 
driveway as determined by Ms. Noonan's own expert, the 
investigating officer and Mr. Yarnell's expert. Ms. Noonan was no-
where near the driveway. (T.159 lines 19-22; T.160 lines 18-25; 
T.161 lines 1-2, and 16-20; T.218 lines 1-17; T.386 lines 22-24.) 
12. When Ms. Noonan saw Mr. Yarnell coming behind her she 
could have gone to the next intersection and turned around. She 
elected not to because "I wanted to get out of the way and get back 
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to where I needed to be." (T.63 lines 8-11.) 
13. Ms. Noonan was not familiar with the area. In fact she 
changed her mind two or three times with respect to where she was 
going to make this U-turn. It was never her intent to make a left 
turn. (T.63 lines 17-23.) 
14. Further, Ms. Noonan didn't slow down until she actually 
started to make her turn. By her own testimony the Yarnell vehicle 
was coming fast behind her and was close enough for her to see Mr. 
and Mrs. Yarnell allegedly having a discussion and she turned in 
front of them anyway. (T.45 lines 16-25; T.46 lines 1-5; T.61 
lines 8-11; T.65 lines 1-2; T.66 lines 4-7; T.67 lines 2-4.) 
Q: What happened next? 
A: I did one more rear-view check in my 
mirror and I noticed that the people in the 
car were having some kind of discussion. I 
went ahead and made my left turn, . . . 
(T.45 lines 21-25; T46: lines 1-5.) 
15. Mr. and Mrs. Yarnell were stopped at the light at the 
intersection 1900 West and 12th South. (T.129 lines 6-10.) 
16. Mr. Yarnell was through the intersection when he saw Mrs. 
Noonan's brake lights come on and her vehicle move to the right. 
(T.118 lines 24-25; T.129 lines 22-21; T.131 lines 4-18; T.137 
lines 3-14.) 
17. When Mr. Yarnell saw Ms. Noonan pull to the right he 
"pulled over a little ways" but did not make a lane change. (T.125 
lines 14-17.) 
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18. Mrs. Yarnell also saw Ms. Noonan move to the right. She 
saw one blink of a turn signal just prior to Ms. Noonan turning in 
front of them. (T.365 lines 1-14; T.373 lines 21-25; T.374 lines 
1-5; T.375 lines 10-20.) 
19. Mrs. Yarnell testified that they were traveling 30 to 35 
miles per hour. They had no time to stop when they saw the brake 
lights. MI mean I didn't have enough time to grit my teeth." 
(T.374 lines 20-25.) 
20. Mr. Yarnell also testified there was no way to avoid the 
collision. (T.123 lines 11-13; T.124 lines 11-15.) 
21. When Mr. Yarnell saw Ms. Noonan's brake lights and saw 
her move to the right he thought she was going to stop. He 
attempted to pull around her, when she turned right in front of 
him. (T.129 lines 12-21; T.130 lines 15-19; T.131 lines 13-21; 
T.137 lines 3-13.) 
22. Mr. Yarnell never saw Ms. Noonan's left turn signal 
despite what it said in his statement. Further, Mr. Yarnell never 
wrote that statement even though he signed it. His wife was there 
at the time the statement was taken and had input into the 
statement. (T.114 lines 24-25; T.115 lines 1-22; T.116 lines 1-25; 
T.117 lines 3-9; T.119 line 5; T.368 lines 7-25; T.369 line 1.) 
23. The investigating officer Bruce Hartman arrived at the 
scene and observed a large semi-tractor parked off the side of the 
road. (T.141 lines 5-8.) 
24. He subsequently took statements from Mr. Yarnell and Ms. 
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Noonan. He did not take a statement from Mrs. Yarnell because he 
felt that she was too upset. This is contradicted by Mrs. 
Yarnell's testimony wherein she stated that she was fine. (T.144 
line 25; T.145 lines 1-2; T.369 lines 18-23.) 
25. At the scene of the accident Sgt. Bruce Hartman 
determined that the point of impact was 76 feet north of the 
driveway Ms. Noonan allegedly was going to turn into. He also 
testified that Ms. Noonan was not near the driveway when she was 
signaling. (T.159 lines 19-23; T.160 lines 18-25; T.161 lines 1-2 
and 16-20.) 
26. While at the scene Officer Hartman testified that he 
checked the rightside of the road for debris and furrow marks in 
the gravel in both directions for 300 feet. He did not find any 
markings on the right side of the road. (T.158 lines 9-13.) 
27. At the hospital he had Mr. Yarnell prepare a written 
statement. He testified he saw Mr. Yarnell write the statement and 
that he reviewed it with him. (T.162 lines 23-25; T.163 lines 1-
6.) 
28. Mr. Yarnell testified that the signature on the statement 
was his signature. However, his daughter-in-law had written the 
statement with input from both he and his wife. (T.114 lines 24-
25; T.115 lines 1-22; T.116 lines 1-25; T.117 lines 3-9; T.119 line 
5; T.368 lines 7-25; T.369 lines 1-3.) 
29. After Officer Hartman left the hospital he went back to 
the scene to check for debris on the right side of the road. He 
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found no marks. However, he did admit that it was possible cars 
could have turned into the two driveways and not left marks in the 
hour he was at the hospital. He had no way of knowing whether cars 
did in fact go on the gravel. (T.147 lines 4-19; T.156 lines 6-20; 
T.158 lines 18-25; T.159 lines 1-18.) 
30. Officer Bruce Hartman indicated there were no skid marks 
at the scene so there was no evidence of braking. (T.147 lines 20-
25.) 
31. Finally, officer Hartman testified that he was not an 
accident reconstructionist but looks to the physical evidence at 
the scene. This evidence is then submitted to an accident 
reconstructionist. (T.149 lines 16-25; T.150 lines 1-9.) 
32. Val Shupe, plaintiff's accident reconstructionist relied 
upon the accident report, the information provided him by Sgt. 
Hartman, the depositions of Warren Yarnell and Tina Noonan, Don 
Kennedy's statement, visiting the scene, photos, the damage to the 
vehicles and the position of the vehicles. (T.175 lines 2-12; 
T.182 lines 7-10; T.185 lines 1-8.) 
33. Mr. Shupe testified there were no skid marks at the scene 
indicating that Mr. Yarnell had no time to react, when Ms. Noonan 
turned in front of him. (T.184 lines 8-11; T.207 lines 20-25.) 
34. Mr. Shupe also testified he was unable to determine 
speeds of the vehicles and therefore could not determine at what 
point Ms. Noonan slowed down to 10 to 20 miles per hour to make her 
turn. He had no idea at what point Mr. Yarnell saw Ms. Noonan 
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going 10 miles per hour. Further, there is no collaboration that 
Ms. Noonan turned her signal on a thousand feet prior to the time 
of impact other than her own self report. (T.196 line 25; T.197 
line 1; T.205 lines 17-20; T.216 line 25; T.217 lines 1-2; T.207 
lines 9-16; T.210 line 25; T.211 lines 1-6; T.210 lines 18-24.) 
35. Mr. Shupe also indicated that the point of impact was 76 
feet from the driveway Ms. Noonan allegedly was going to turn into. 
That in fact she had her turn signal on where there was no 
driveway. (T.218 lines 1-17.) 
36. Mr. Shupe testified that if Ms. Noonan did in fact see 
Mr. Yarnell four lengths back from her she could have completed the 
turn. (T217: lines 12-25.) 
37. Part of his opinion was based on the findings of the 
investigating officer who examined the right side of the road and 
saw no marks or furrows indicating a car pulled to the right. 
However, Ms. Yarnell testified that when her daughter-in-law came 
to pick her up she pulled her vehicle onto the right side of the 
road. Mr. Kennedy also parked his semi on the shoulder of the 
road. (T.141 lines 5-8; T.190 lines 20-25; T.369 lines 4-12.) 
38. Mr. Shupe admitted that no one really knows if there were 
any marks on the right side of the road. (T.212 lines 14-18.) 
39. Mr. Shupe admitted that Ms. Noonan had to make sure that 
she could turn safely and that she had a duty to look before she 
proceeded to turn. (T.213 lines 6-19; T.215 lines 2-8.) 
40. Finally, Mr. Shupe testified that if a vehicle were in 
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the process of passing another vehicle and it turned in front of 
the passing vehicle there wouldn't be enough time for perception 
and reaction to take place and the vehicle turning would constitute 
an immediate hazard. (T.216 lines 16-19.) 
41. Mr. Newell Knight defendant's accident reconstructionist 
testified that an accident investigator gathers the physical 
evidence at the scene. An accident reconstructionist, however, 
takes that data and draws conclusions as to how the accident 
happened. (T.379 lines 18-25; T.380 lines 1-25; T.381 line 1.) 
42. Mr. Knight's opinion is based on the accident report, 
photographs of the vehicles, repair estimates, damage photographs, 
the depositions of Warren Yarnell, Tina Noonan and Val Shupe and 
visiting the scene. (T.381 lines 12-24.) 
43. Mr. Knight testified that the perception as one is 
heading northbound on 1900 West is that the wider portion of the 
road is on the eastside or the right side of the road. Whereas the 
perception on the wests ide or left side of the road is that the 
shoulder is very narrow. To document this Mr. Knight showed a film 
of the roadway prepared by the Department of Transportation. 
(T.385 lines 1-25; T.386 lines 1-21; T.387 lines 19-22; T.395 lines 
22-25; T.396 lines 1-3; T.400 lines 13-20; T.402 lines 1-3 and 
T.438 lines 15-20.) 
44. Mr. Knight also found that the point of impact was 70 
plus feet from the farmhouse driveway. (T.386 lines 22-25; T.387 
lines 1-10.) 
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45. Mr. Knight examined the photos documenting the damages 
and the post-impact position of the vehicles. Based on these 
damage photos Mr. Knight concluded that Ms. Noonan had to have 
pulled to the right. In fact she could not have made a U-turn 
without moving to the right. Further, he testified the most 
important piece of evidence is both the damage and lack of damage 
shown on the vehicles. He testified that Ms. Noonan would have had 
to make a very wide turn for the damage that was shown on her 
vehicle. The greatest evidence that she moved to the right was the 
physical damage and the angle of collision. (T.395 lines 10-14; 
T.391 lines 19-25; T.392 lines 1-25; T.393 lines 1-25; T.394 lines 
1-25; T.406 lines 23-24; T.439 lines 11-25; T.440 lines 1-5; T.441 
lines 1-17; T.442 lines 1-25; T.442 lines 1-2.) 
46. Mr. Knight also testified that if someone is coming 
behind you quickly you are going to hold your position your not 
going to turn because in the event you do your going to get hit. 
(T.390 lines 9-18.) 
47. Finally, Mr. Knight concluded that Ms. Noonan pulled to 
the right and turned into the path of the Yarnell vehicle. (T.390 
lines 23-25; T.396 lines 13-18.) 
48. Mr. Knight also concluded that turning in front of a 
vehicle that's coming behind you very quickly is not proper. 
(T.396 lines 4-10; T.430 lines 4-21; T.431 lines 12-23; T.432 lines 
2-25; T.433 lines 1-7.) 
49. With respect to the testimony of Donald Kennedy, the 
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"eyewitness" to the accident, his testimony is quite conflicting as 
demonstrated by the statements contained in his sworn statement and 
then changed and initialed by him. Noteworthy is that he told Mr. 
and Mrs. Yarnell that he would be a witness for them and told Ms. 
Noonan that he would be a witness for her as well. (T.132 lines 
10-19; T.366 lines 13-25; T.367 lines 1-3.) 
50. Prior to the trial, proceedings were held in Judge Hyde's 
chambers in which plaintiff made a motion in limine and requested 
that the sworn statement of Donald Kennedy, an eyewitness to the 
accident be excluded. In making this request plaintiff alleged 
that this "sworn statement" was in fact a deposition of which he 
had no notice of. Therefore, it should be excluded at trial. (T.7 
lines 15-25; T.8 lines 22-25; T.9 lines 11-16.) 
51. The court found that the statement of Donald Kennedy was 
in fact a "sworn statement" not a deposition, and could be used as 
a prior inconsistent statement for the purpose of impeachment only. 
(T.8: lines 22-25; T.9: lines 1-21; T.10: lines 5-7.) 
The court: She's not offering it as a 
deposition. What she is, if I understand what 
she's saying, is if he's going to be a 
witness, he's going to testify, and this 
statement, apparently she intends to use to 
show there are prior inconsistent statements 
and that she can do. But only if it comes in 
before. She can't use it directly. 
(T.9 lines 12-17.) 
52. In the course of trial plaintiff once again objected to 
the use of the statement of Donald Kennedy. The court overruled 
13 
the objection finding that the statement of Donald Kennedy was not 
a deposition and could be used as a prior inconsistent statement. 
(T.89 lines 24-25; T.90 lines 1-5.) 
53. After trial of this matter plaintiff again raised the 
argument that the statement of Donald Kennedy was a deposition and 
not a sworn statement maintaining that because it was taken under 
oath and in the presence of a court reporter it was a deposition. 
Plaintiff, under objection by defendant, moved the court to publish 
this "sworn statement". (See Exhibit 1 (Reporters Transcript), 
page 6 lines 1-4; page 8 lines 5-18; page 9 lines 17-25; page 10 
lines 9-14.) 
54. The court published the sworn statement for the limited 
purpose of determining whether the statement was a sworn statement 
or a deposition and for no other purpose. (See Exhibit 1 
(Reporters Transcript), page 11 lines 12-15; page 12 lines 24-25; 
page 13 lines 1-13; page 14 lines 14-20.) 
55. In the course of trial officer Hartman the investigating 
officer was asked to give an opinion as to fault. Defendant 
objected to the testimony on the basis that officer Hartman was not 
an accident reconstructionist and not qualified to testify as to 
fault. The court sustained the objection. (T.149 lines 16-18; 
T.150 lines 5-6, 10-24; T.154 lines 15-20; T.155 lines 2-25; T.156 
lines 1-2; T.157 lines 1-4.) 
56. After both sides rested, counsel met in chambers to 
discuss jury instructions. Plaintiffs counsel objected to jury 
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instruction 10 being given. Jury instruction 10 in the pertinent 
part states: 
A person may not operate a motor vehicle at a speed 
so slow as to impede or block the normal and reasonable 
movement of traffic except when: 
(A) Reduced speed is necessary for safe 
operation; 
(B) Upon a grade; or 
(C) In compliance with official traffic 
control devices. (R.278.) 
57. Plaintiff requested a subsection (D) be added to the 
instruction which would state "When making a proper left-hand 
turn." (T.456 line 16-18.) 
58. The court ruled that jury instruction number 10 could 
stand as is. In making that ruling the court determined that 
plaintiff's requested change (the addition of subsection (D) "when 
making a proper left-hand turn" was covered by subsection (A) of 
jury instruction 10. The court told plaintiff's counsel they could 
argue their requested addition in closing argument. (T.470 lines 
17-22; T.472 lines 2-6, 14-17.) 
59. Plaintiff's counsel did in fact argue their requested 
version of jury instruction number 10 during closing argument. 
(T.515 lines 5-20.) 
60. At the conclusion of trial and on special verdict the 
jury determined that Yarnell was negligent, but his negligence was 
not the proximate cause of the accident. (R.346) 
61. The court then entered a judgment based on the special 
verdict in favor of defendant Warren Yarnell. (R.366) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's brief addresses four points on appeal. Point I 
deals with the issue of whether the evidence supports the verdict. 
In addressing that issue Utah Case Law is clear that plaintiff has 
the burden of marshalling the evidence and showing that the 
evidence and the inferences therefrom presented in a light most 
favorable to the prevailing party, was insufficient to support the 
verdict. Plaintiff has failed to do so. This being the case the 
appellate court assumes the record supports the findings of the 
trial court and proceeds to review the accuracy of the lower 
court's conclusions of law and application of that law. 
Point II of plaintiff's brief addresses the issue of whether 
jury instruction 10 was confusing or misleading and whether it was 
appropriate for the court to exclude plaintiff's requested 
supplement to jury instruction 10. The basis for defendant's 
argument is that the instruction requested by plaintiff is already 
incorporated in and is part of jury instruction 10 and jury 
instruction 9. Therefore, the court properly excluded defendant's 
requested addition to jury instruction 10. 
Point III of plaintiff's brief dealt with excluding the 
investigating officers testimony as to fault. It is defendant's 
position that Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Ut. App. 1991) and 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Ut. App. 
1991), are two cases on point which hold an investigating officer 
or accident reconstructionist cannot testify as to a legal opinion. 
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Therefore, the trial court properly excluded the testimony of 
plaintiff's investigating officer regarding his opinion as to 
fault. Further, the investigating officer admitted he was not an 
accident reconstruction!st and his testimony was properly excluded 
on this basis as well. 
Finally, plaintiff in Point IV of her brief argued that the 
statement of Donald Kennedy taken by defendant was a deposition 
that she was not given notice of. Defendant maintains and the 
record supports that this was in fact a "sworn statement". 
Further, defendant maintains that a statement taken under oath and 
in the presence of a court reporter does not make it a deposition. 
This sworn statement for the purposes of the hearsay rule is 
considered a prior inconsistent statement. This being the case it 
can be used for impeachment. Defendant maintains that he properly 
used it to impeach the witness. By definition if you attack a 
witnesses credibility this is going to be prejudicial to the 
adverse party. Probative value is not the issue. 
Defendant in Point V of his brief maintains that this appeal 
filed by plaintiff for the reasons stated above, is a frivolous 
appeal designed to harass defendant and defense counsel, to 
increase legal fees and to use up the court's time. For this 
reason, defendant has requested he receive attorney's fees and 
costs pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
and Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT RULED APPROPRIATELY IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Plaintiff should not be granted a new trial just because she 
is dissatisfied with the jury's verdict. This is clearly reflected 
in Argument Point I of her brief. Rather, "A new trial may 
properly be granted only when the jury's verdict is manifestly 
against the weight of the evidence'.'1 Price-Orem Inv. v. Rollins, 
Brown & Gunnel 1, 713 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1986). Further, "An 
appellate court does not lightly disturb the verdict of a jury nor 
the findings of fact made by a trial court." Saunders v. Sharp, 
806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). In the event appellant challenges 
the jury's findings then "appellant must marshall all evidence in 
favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then demonstrate 
that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings 
of fact." Saunders, supra 199. Specifically, "they must set out 
in their briefs, with record references, all the evidence that 
supports the verdict, including all valid inferences to that 
effect, and demonstrate that reasonable people would not conclude 
that the evidence supports the verdict." Hodges v. Gibson Products 
Co. , 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991). Finally, if the appellant 
fails to marshall the evidence, the appellate court assumes the 
record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to 
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review the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the 
application of that law in the case. Saunders, supra, Id., 199. 
Plaintiff has failed to "marshal1 the evidence and demonstrate 
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact.11 
Rather, all she has done is attempt to argue that "proximate cause" 
is a question of law and therefore the appellate court should find 
in her favor. However, as a general rule, (Except in very limited 
circumstances not present here. i.e. Mitchell v. Pearson 
Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), to allow the jury to decide 
the issue of proximate cause would allow them to speculate.) 
proximate cause is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. 
Watters v. Ouerry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 1981); Harris v Utah Transit 
Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983). 
Clearly, then "for [plaintiff to overturn the jury verdict] 
she must set out in her [brief], with record references, all the 
evidence that supports the verdict, including all valid inferences 
to that effect, and demonstrate that reasonable people would not 
conclude that the evidence supports the verdict." Hodges v. Gibson 
Products Co. , 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991). In that light the 
Utah Supreme Court also stated: 
We emphasize that it is counsel's professional 
duty to analyze the evidence with care and 
provide record citations for every asserted 
factual proposition. It is not the duty of an 
appellate court in a civil case to canvass the 
record on its own to determine the sufficiency 
of the evidence. Id. 156. 
Noonan has failed to adequately and appropriately "marshall 
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the evidence". She clearly has not presented the "evidence that 
supports the verdict, including all valid inferences to that 
effect. . . . " Hodaes. Id. 156. To that end the appellate court 
should support the findings of the trial court and proceed to 
review the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the 
application of that law. Saunders, 199. 
Viewing the evidence as outlined in defendant's statement of 
facts in the light most favorable to the verdict it is clear that 
the evidence does in fact support the jury verdict. It follows 
then that the district court ruled appropriately in denying 
plaintiff's request for a new trial. Plaintiff has failed to meet 
the burden of showing that the jury verdict was "manifestly against 
the weight of evidence". Therefore, plaintiff's request for a new 
trial should be denied. 
II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE SUBMISSION OF 
JURY INSTRUCTION 10. 
Under Utah Law, an improper jury instruction is grounds for 
"reversible error 'if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice 
of the complaining party.,M Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225, 
1230 (Utah App. 1991). 
Jury instruction number 10 in the pertinent part provides: 
(R.278) 
A person may not operate a motor vehicle at a 
speed so slow as to impede or block the normal 
and reasonable movement of traffic except 
when: 
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A. Reduced speed is necessary for safe 
operation; 
B. Upon a grade; or 
C. In compliance with official traffic 
control devices. 
This section is taken verbatim out of the Motor Vehicle Code 
§ 41-6-49. Plaintiff has requested that a "subsection D". be 
added to the last paragraph of the instruction which would state: 
"When making a proper left-hand turn." (T: 
456 lines 16-18) 
As a basis for her argument plaintiff referred to U.C.A. § 41-
6-55(3). (T.455: lines 24-25.) That section provides in the 
pertinent part: 
The overtaking and passing of vehicles 
proceeding in the same direction is subject to 
the following provisions: . . . 
(3) On a highway having more than one lane in 
the same direction, the operator of a vehicle 
traveling in a left lane shall, upon being 
overtaken by another vehicle in the same lane, 
yield to the overtaking vehicle by moving 
safely to the right, and may not impede the 
movement or free flow of traffic in a left 
lane except: 
(A) When preparing to turn left; . . . 
This section, however, does not apply because 1900 West is 
"not a highway having more than one lane in the same direction." 
1900 West is a two lane road, with one lane in each direction. 
(T.54 lines 11-13, 25; T.63 lines 12-16; T.130 lines 9-12; T.458 
lines 4-5.) 
Further, in her brief Ms. Noonan has misrepresented what the 
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court's findings were with respect to jury instruction 10. In the 
final analysis, plaintiff was not clear as to what the court's 
ruling was. This was demonstrated by the interchange which took 
place as follows: 
Mr. Johnson: Your Honor, I'm a little bit 
unsure now what you decided on that. 
The Court: I nave decided that in effect it's 
covered by reducing speed to what's necessary 
for the safe operation of the vehicle because 
the safe operation of the left turn would 
require less speed. It is therefore covered 
and you may argue it. 
(T.471 line 25; T.472 lines 2-6.) 
In essence plaintiff is arguing that the jury needs to be made 
aware that it is appropriate for an individual to slow down to 
negotiate a left turn. Not only is this argument covered by 
subsection A of the third paragraph of jury instruction 10 as well 
as jury instruction 9 (R.277) but it is common sense. This was 
also pointed out by the court when the court stated that it is 
obvious that an individual making a left turn needs to slow down 
before making that turn and it is not possible to make a left turn 
at 55 miles an hour. (T.471 lines 11-14.) 
Jury instruction 9 also covers this issue wherein it states in 
the pertinent part: (R.277) 
It is the duty of every driver to use 
reasonable care to avoid danger. In that 
regard, every driver is obliged: 
5. To stop or suddenly slow down only 
after observing that it can be done safely 
and, if an opportunity exists, after 
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signaling. 
Further, plaintiff was allowed to argue his requested addition 
to jury instruction 10 in closing argument, which he did. (T.515 
lines 5-19.) 
In further support of her argument plaintiff's attorney relies 
on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley 
Hospital, 830 P.2d 270 (Utah 1992). However, this case is clearly 
distinguishable from the present case. Nielsen v. Pioneer 
Hospital, Supra. involved a situation where plaintiff Nielsen was 
admitted to defendant Pioneer Valley Hospital for knee surgery. 
She had a history of dental problems during the previous year and 
had undergone significant dental work. Approximately two hours 
after her surgery was done and she was in the recovery room a nurse 
discovered that several of Nielsen's teeth were broken and her 
bridge work was damaged. Nielsen subsequently brought an action 
against both the doctor and the hospital. 
An issue arose as to the jury instructions. One set of jury 
instructions dealt with the legal theories of negligence and res 
ipsa loquitur. In this regard the court found that these were 
rather involved negligence theories and that nowhere was the jury 
ever told that the negligence instruction did not apply if the res 
ipsa loquitur elements as set out in that instruction were found to 
exist. 
The court found another set of jury instructions even more 
misleading in that they gave conflicting instructions with respect 
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to using a professional standard of care versus a common knowledge 
standard of care. These instructions directly contradicted each 
other. The court in these circumstances found that plaintiff was 
denied a fair trial. 
Clearly, the same type of confusion does not exist in the 
present case. It does not involve complex legal theories or 
contradictory instructions and hence confusing jury instructions 
like in Nielsen. Rather, the present case involves a question of 
whether the failure to give plaintiff's request addition to jury 
instruction 10 prejudices her case. It is clear from the facts 
plaintiff has not been prejudice. Jury instruction 10 does in fact 
in subsection A provide that an individual may slow down so as to 
impede the flow of traffic "when reduced speed is necessary for 
safe operation". Jury instruction 9 also instructs the jury that 
an individual can stop or suddenly slow down only after observing 
that it can be done safely and signaling where possible. Finally, 
it is common sense that an individual can slow down to make a left 
turn. In Nielsen, Supra. the jury instructions were quite 
conflicting, confusing, and fairly technical. This could not be 
said about jury instruction 10 that plaintiff is now objecting to. 
Finally, "it is not prejudicial error to fail to use specific 
instructions if the substance of the requested instruction is 
covered in the instructions given." Joraensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 
80, 82 (Utah 1987). It is clear in the present case that 
plaintiff's requested addition to jury instruction 10 was in fact 
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given in "subsection A" of jury instruction 10 and in jury 
instruction 9. 
Further, "failure to give the requested jury instruction is 
reversible error if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice 
of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises 
the jury on the law." Joraensen, Id. 82 and cases cited therein. 
See also Davidson v Prince, supra; Hall v. Blackman, 417 P.2d 664, 
667 (Utah 1966) (where there must be some showing that the error 
was substantial and prejudicial.) Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchangef 817 P.2d 789 (Ut. 1991). 
It is clear that plaintiff has not met the burden of showing 
that the failure to add "subsection D." to jury instruction 10 was 
a substantial error and prejudicial to his client. It is clearly 
covered by other instructions. Further, it is common sense that 
one must slow down before making any turn. There is absolutely no 
confusion in the failure to add "subsection D". Further, the motor 
vehicle provision plaintiff relies on to add "subsection D." does 
not apply in this case in that this was not a four lane highway or 
a highway with two lanes in each direction. Rather, it was a one 
lane highway in each direction. 
At most if the court's failure to give the requested 
instruction is anything, which we maintain the instruction was 
appropriate, it is harmless error and is not grounds for a new 
trial. 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN EXCLUDING THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S 
TESTIMONY AS TO FAULT. 
In the course of plaintiff's case, Sgt. Bruce Hartman, the 
investigating officer was called to testify regarding defendant's 
fault. (T.149 lines 1-5; T.155 line 25; T.156 lines 1-25; and 
T.157 line 1.) Defendant entered an objection and requested to 
voir dire the witness who admitted that he was not an accident 
reconstructionist. He testified that his duty is to investigate 
the physical evidence at the scene. He also testified that most 
investigators then send their data to an accident 
reconstructionist. (T.149 lines 16-25; T.150 lines 1-9.) The 
court sustained the objection. Clearly, Mr. Hartman was not 
qualified to render an opinion as to fault or cause of this 
collision and his testimony in this regard was properly excluded. 
Assuming, he was qualified, he would still not be able to 
testify as to cause or fault of the accident for the reason that it 
calls for a legal opinion and such determinations are left to the 
jury. Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1987) 
Steffensen v. Smiths Management Corporation, 820 P.2d 482, 491 
(Utah App. 1991); Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
On appeal plaintiff argues that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error by excluding Mr. Hartman's testimony because it 
was allowed under Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 702. However, Rule 
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702 just provides the basis for an expert's testimony but does not 
address the issue of whether an expert can give an opinion as to 
the ultimate issue, i.e. fault. The appropriate rule of evidence 
is Rule 704. 
In reviewing challenges to evidentiary rulings, the appellate 
court "give[s] deference to the trial court's advantageous position 
and [does not] overturn the result unless it is clear that the 
trial court erred." Whitehead v. American Motor Sales Corp., 801 
P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990). 
Further, plaintiff has the burden of showing the evidence 
excluded could have influenced the jury to render a different 
verdict. Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah App. 1991). 
Davidson v. Prince, supra, is a case on point. Noteworthy, 
plaintiff cited this case elsewhere in his brief but did not point 
out the case to the court, a case which is contrary to his 
position. In Davidson, their accident reconstruction expert was 
called to testify regarding defendant's negligence. Plaintiff's 
counsel asked their reconstruction expert if he had an opinion 
regarding defendant's negligence. The reconstruction expert 
responded affirmatively. He was then asked to express his opinion 
and defendant's counsel objected on the grounds that the question 
pertained to an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. The 
trial court sustained defendant's objection. On appeal plaintiff 
argued that the trial court committed prejudicial error by 
excluding the reconstructionist testimony because such opinion 
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testimony is admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 704. 
The Davidson court acknowledged that expert testimony 
regarding the ultimate issue is admissible under Rule 704. Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 704 states: "Testimony in the form of an 
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable 
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact." 
The appellate court, however, affirmed the trial court's 
exclusion of the accident reconstructionist testimony as to fault 
on the grounds that it was a legal conclusion. They pointed out 
that Rule 704 "abolishes the per se rule against testimony 
regarding ultimate issues of fact, it does not allow all opinions." 
Id. 1231 The appellate court then referred to the Advisory 
Committee notes to Rule 704 which made clear that "questions which 
would merely allow the witness to tell the jury what result to 
reach are not permitted. Nor is the rule intended to allow a 
witness to give legal conclusions." Omen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 
F.2d 236, 240 (Fifth Circuit, 1983). The appellate court thus 
concluded that an "expert generally cannot give an opinion as to 
whether an individual was "negligent" because such an opinion would 
require a legal conclusion." Xd. 1231 
More specifically, in Davidson, the accident reconstructionist 
was allowed to give his an opinion as to "the reason appellees 
truck overturned while going around a curve, that the truck was 
traveling too fast for the curve, what the speed limit was at the 
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curve, whether a person hauling livestock should be concerned with 
his load and what the concerns should be, and whether a person 
hauling livestock could foresee the possibility of injury if the 
truck overturned." Id. 1231. The only evidence the trial court 
excluded was the accident reconstructionist's conclusions regarding 
fault. The appellate court further pointed out that ,f[The 
reconstructionist's] testimony was not technical or difficult to 
understand, but was expressed in lay terms. The trial judge did 
not err in excluding [the reconstructionist's] opinion testimony 
that appellee was negligent. The excluded testimony was an answer 
to a specific question which would appear on the verdict form, a 
question which must be answered based upon the judge's definition 
of a legal term "negligence". Questions which allow a witness to 
simply tell the jury what result to reach are not permitted." Id. 
1231. The court further stated that: 
"Given that [the reconstructionist's] 
testimony was easily understandable and that 
[the reconstructionist] was allowed to testify 
as to everything except his final conclusion 
that appellee was negligent, the testimony was 
properly excluded as the jury was capable of 
drawing its own conclusions from the evidence 
presented and after instruction from the 
court." Id. 1232. 
Similarly in the present case there was nothing technically 
difficult about the testimony of Sgt. Hartman. In fact, the case 
is a very simple automobile accident. Sgt. Hartman was allowed to 
testify as to the point of impact, the observed path of travel and 
the final resting place and position of the vehicles following the 
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impact. (T.144 lines 11-21; T.147 lines 4-24; T.152 line 25; T.153 
lines 1-15; T.157 lines 8-25; T.158 lines 1-13; T.159 lines 2-13; 
lines 19-22; T.160 lines 18-25; T.161, lines 1-2.) Officer Hartman 
was also asked his opinion as to the cause or fault in this 
accident. That was properly objected to and the evidence properly 
excluded as calling for a legal opinion. As the Utah Appellate 
Court stated in Davidson v. Prince. Supra. and later in Steffensen 
v. Smiths Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 491, (Ut. App. 1991) it 
is the province of the jury to assess negligence and apportion 
fault. The jurors are given a special verdict form which addresses 
these very issues. 
Therefore, it follows then that the court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding the investigating officer's testimony as to 
fault. 
IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
FINDING THE SWORN STATEMENT OF DONALD KENNEDY 
TO BE A PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT. 
Plaintiff is still under the misconception that the statement 
taken of Donald Kennedy, the eyewitness, was a deposition. This 
clearly was not a deposition but a sworn statement. Mr. Kennedy 
was contacted regarding his statement. He voluntarily came forward 
as an independent witness, offered to have his sworn statement 
taken, and in fact offered to do so at his place of residence. 
(R.490-499). In fact Mr. Kennedy was sent notice confirming with 
him that his sworn statement would be taken on November 7, 1991, at 
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4:30 p.m. at his home. (R.496). 
The final document produced was inadvertently entitled 
deposition by the court reporter on the cover of what was clearly 
a sworn statement. The court reporter then submitted an affidavit 
demonstrating this defect. (R.499). 
Apparently, plaintiff does not see a difference between a 
sworn statement and a deposition and in fact admitted so. (T.7 
lines 23-25). A statement of an independent witness can be taken 
in many different ways. Plaintiff fails to see that a statement 
can be taken by writing the statement and having the witness sign 
it, by recording the statement and transcribing it or in the manner 
in which it was done, using the court reporter to take down the 
testimony. The fact a court reporter is present and the witness 
put under oath does not make it a deposition as plaintiff would 
have you believe. (T.7 lines 23-25; T.8 line 1; Exhibit 1 
Reporter's Transcript) page 7 lines 11-18; page 9 lines 22-24; page 
12 lines 3-7.) In this regard the court stated: 
The Court: You can do that, you can use any 
statement of any . . oral, written, under 
oath, not under oath, whatever. So long as 
it's a prior statement. The fact that it was 
taken under oath does not make it a 
deposition. 
Exhibit No. 1 (Reporters Transcript) page 12 lines 3-6. 
Plaintiff did file a motion in limine prior to trial. In 
regard to that motion the court aptly noted the use of Mr. 
Kennedy's sworn statement was a prior inconsistent statement (for 
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impeachment) and not to be used as direct evidence or to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted. (T.9 lines 1-4). Clearly, pursuant 
to the court's ruling it was not to be used as a deposition for 
direct testimony but only as a prior inconsistent statement for 
impeachment purposes, a fact plaintiff does not understand and 
chooses to ignore. Specifically, the court found: 
The Court: She's not offering it as a 
deposition. What she is, if I understand what 
she's saying, is if he's going to be a 
witness, he's going to testify, and this 
statement, apparently she intends to use to 
show there are prior inconsistent statements 
in it and that she can do. But only if it 
comes in before. She can't use it directly. 
(T.9 lines 12-17). 
There is no doubt that this is a sworn statement and not a 
deposition. This being the case a sworn statement is hearsay and 
therefore cannot be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
Basically, a sworn statement can be used to impeach the witness, 
which was done in this case. (Exhibit 1 (Reporters Transcript) 
page 7 lines 21-23; page 8 lines 5-8; page 9 lines 2-7, 17-20; page 
11 lines 24-25; page 13 lines 22-23.) 
Specifically, of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801 states 
that a statement is hearsay. Subsection c provides: "Hearsay is 
a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying 
at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted." Subsection d goes on to describe those 
circumstances in which statements are not hearsay and one of those 
circumstances is when used as a prior inconsistent statement on 
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cross-examination to impeach a witness. Specifically Utah Rules of 
Evidence Rule 801 (d)(1) states as follows: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A 
statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The 
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning 
the statement and the statement is (A) 
inconsistent with his testimony or the witness 
denies having made the statement or has 
forgotten, . . . 
It follows then under Rule 801(d)(1) that the statement taken 
of Donald Kennedy can be used as a prior inconsistent statement for 
impeachment. 
In a subsequent hearing after the trial which is entitled 
Reporter's Transcript and attached as Exhibit 1 plaintiff made a 
motion to have the sworn statement of Donald Kennedy made a part of 
the record. Defendant objected to that motion maintaining that it 
should not be made part of the record since it was a prior 
inconsistent statement used to impeach and not direct evidence. 
The court found that the sworn statement of Donald Kennedy could be 
used for the limited purpose of having it before the appellate 
court so they could make a determination as to whether it was a 
sworn statement or a deposition and for that purpose only. 
(Exhibit 1 Reporter's Transcript page 12 lines 13-14, 23-25; page 
13 lines 1-4; page 14 lines 14-20). 
Note that the sworn statement consists of the transcribed 
testimony of Donald Kennedy at the time this statement was taken 
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and changes to the statement initialed by him. Mr. Kennedy made 
significant changes to the sworn statement and these were asked 
about at the time of trial for the purpose of impeaching his 
testimony and attacking his credibility. (T: 85, lines 12-15). 
Noteworthy is that these changes were made in Mr. Durbano's 
office in the presence of Mr. Johnson. (T: 85, lines 16-23). 
On all the changes Mr. Kennedy made he basically responded 
that he would have to review the police report to "jog his memory". 
(T.86 lines 5-8). 
As part of plaintiff's argument to exclude the evidence she is 
now arguing that the statement of Donald Kennedy including the 
changes should not have been admitted for the reason that its 
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice and by its tendency to mislead and confuse the 
jury. This is the first time they have raised this issue, i.e., 
that the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value. 
It is fair to say that any time an individual is attempting to 
impeach the direct testimony of an eyewitness using a prior 
inconsistent statement it is going to by definition have a 
prejudicial effect. If the statement is contrary to the statement 
initially made by the witness it does have a prejudicial effect, it 
impacts his credibility. This is the purpose that the sworn 
statement was used, to attack Mr. Kennedy's credibility. The 
probative value of the testimony was not at issue. Rather, what is 
at issue is the use of a prior inconsistent statement for 
34 
impeachment purposes and not for the truth of the matter asserted. 
Defendant was trying to show that Mr. Kennedy has no credibility, 
not that what he said is in fact true. 
Prior to beginning the sworn statement Mr. Kennedy was advised 
that he would have an opportunity to review the statement and make 
any changes. He was also advised as to the ramification of making 
those changes in that they could be used to impeach him at the time 
of trial. (T.88. lines 15-23.) 
In plaintiff's brief he alleges that Mr. Kennedy was not 
allowed to review the police report for more than a few minutes. 
This is the testimony according to Mr. Kennedy. On cross-
examination Mr. Kennedy was asked as follows: 
Q: . . . but in these changes you wrote, for 
the majority of them, is it not true, that I 
would have to read the police report, isn't 
that true, to refresh my memory? 
A: Sure, after I reviewed the police report, 
sure, I can make changes. 
Q: Yes, that's what you said, but the fact of 
the matter is, you did review the police 
report, you did review your statement, and you 
did all that, and then when we went back on 
the record and I asked you questions. Do you 
recall that? 
A: Yes I do. 
(T.86 lines 5-14). 
Further, Mr. Kennedy was given an opportunity to review the 
police report and then questions were asked with respect to that 
police report. One such question dealt with the issue of who was 
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at fault. The interchange occurred as follows: 
Q: . . . You just read your statement and I 
asked you, . . . do you ever recall . . . 
saying to the officer one particular driver 
was at fault and they should be cited? 
A: No. I just said it was obvious who was at 
fault to me. 
Q: . . . Do you still remember finding that 
it was the first vehicle that was at fault, 
the one who made the left turn at fault? And 
you originally put yes. This was after you 
read your police report, after you read your 
statement, do you remember this? 
A: No, I don't. 
Q: It's written down here, isn't it? It's on 
page 24, line 8. Is that the question you 
were asked and is that how you answered it? 
A: Apparently. 
(T.86 lines 19-25; T.87 lines 1-11) 
He then states on page 87, lines 20-21 that we went off the 
record so many times he didn't know when we were off and when we 
were on the record. However, in looking at the record the only 
time it indicates we went off the record was on page 24, line 17. 
It is clear from the changes that Mr. Kennedy made that they 
were material changes to the original testimony. In fact, they 
completely contradicted his initial testimony. This is 
demonstrated by the following: 
Q: Did you ever see any brake lights? 
A: No. But it did slow down, I'm sure it was 
so obvious that the guy swung clear to the 
right like he was going to make a right-hand 
turn and then came back to the left. Do you 
remember saying that? 
A: Sure. 
Q: Okay. Do you remember making the change, 
that's all I recall now, but without reviewing 
the accident report I couldn't say for sure. 
Do you remember writing that in there? 
A: Yes I remember writing. 
Q: Do you remember reviewing the accident 
report? 
A: Uh, huh. 
(T.91 lines 24-25; T.92 lines 1-13). 
Q: . . . So she then swung to the right? 
A: Yes. And then you changed it. That's 
what I remember, but without seeing the 
accident report, my memory's a bit hazy. You 
saw the accident report, didn't you? Your 
answer? 
A: Yes. 
(T.92 lines 19-25). 
Q: . . . then I asked you on line 24, how far 
off the roadway did she get, do you know? 
A: I think she crossed the white line, that 
her tires crossed the white line. It was far 
enough for me to think, well, she was 
obviously going to make a right-hand turn. Do 
you remember answering that? 
A: No. 
Q: But it's written down here isn't it? 
A: Uh, huh. 
Q: So you must have said it? 
A: I must have, sure. 
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Q: Do you remember changing it to say instead 
of I know, you changed it to I think, and 
then, without reviewing the accident report 
and jogging my memory, I couldn't be sure, but 
what I recall right now is that. Do you 
remember writing that? 
A: Uh, huh. 
Q: Do you remember writing it in Mr. 
Durbano's office with Mr. Johnson present? 
A: no response. 
(T.92 line 25; T.93 lines 2-20). 
Q: . . . Then turn to page 12, line three. 
Question, Okay. Now, when you say she was 
going to make a right-hand turn, where she was 
going to turn right. . . Answer: I don't 
know. That's what got me, whether she was 
going to pull off the road on the shoulder or 
what, and I'm pretty sure she was going to 
pull off the right-hand side because she did 
go off past the white line and then came back 
and made a left-hand turn. Do you remember 
telling me that? 
A: Sure. 
Q: Do you remember changing that and the 
change being, I don't know, that's . . . 
A: Because that whole thing's totally 
backwards. I had to change it to make any 
context out of the thing. 
(T.93 lines 24-25; T.94 lines 1-9). 
Q: . . . Then we return to page 13, line 8. 
Then apparently she decided she was going to 
make a left-hand turn. Apparently she just 
swung way wide to make a left-hand turn, is 
what it was, and the guy behind her was 
mistaken that she was going to pull off the 
road or make a right-hand turn off the road 
and went to go around her in the left-hand 
lane and she swung wide enough and made a 
left-hand turn, and he just broad sided her 
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and turned her. The changes were, then 
apparently she decided she's going to make a 
left-hand turn. Apparently, I'm thinking is 
what you added, she just swung way wide to 
make a left-hand turn, and I'm thinking the 
guy behind her was mistaken. And then once 
again, without reviewing my prior statement, I 
can't be sure. . . . And up to the time you 
got your . . . this whole thing interlineated 
this way, isn't it? 
A: Uh, huh. 
Q: . . . even assuming the facts as you wrote 
them here, okay, and that is that there are 
two north bound cars, the first signaled for a 
left turn and in this report you didn't say 
when she signaled, you don't know when she 
signaled, do you? She could have signaled, 
the first car could have signaled that second 
or been signaling, as we sit here today, you 
don't know. 
A: I couldn't tell. 
Clearly, from some of the aforementioned sections of the sworn 
statement that were used to impeach Mr. Kennedy it is clear that 
they were statements contradicting his original testimony. In his 
original testimony he indicated that plaintiff had pulled to the 
right and then turned left in front of Mr. Yarnell. Subsequently, 
in the presence of Mr. Johnson, plaintiff's attorney, changes were 
made to that statement which indicated he needed to see the police 
report to "jog his memory". He was then shown the police report 
and after reviewing it he still had a recollection of plaintiff's 
vehicle moving to the right. (T.92 line 1; T.93, lines 1-11). 
When he testified at the time of trial it was obvious that he 
had changed his entire testimony from that of the sworn statement. 
39 
Clearly, then, defendant was using the sworn statement as a prior 
inconsistent statement to impeach Mr. Kennedy's testimony. One can 
only expect that when a witness completely changes his testimony 
that this will have a prejudicial effect on the jury. However, the 
issue as to the substance of this testimony was never reached by 
using the sworn statement. Rather, it was to attack his 
credibility and in essence make him a non-witness. Therefore, it 
is not necessary to get into the issue whether the probative value 
outweighs the prejudicial effect or whether the statement was 
confusing or misleading to the jury. The purpose was to show that 
Mr. Kennedy lacked credibility, and that purpose was apparently 
achieved by the jury's verdict. 
As to the allegation on page 28 of plaintiff's brief that 
during the sworn statement there was testimony that was offered but 
never recorded. We would refer the court to the sworn statement, 
page 27, line 17, where there was only one occasion of going off 
the record. The document speaks for itself and it is clear we did 
not go on and off the record as Mr. Kennedy would have one believe. 
(T.87: lines 20-21.) With regard to the remaining character 
accusations contained in plaintiff's brief, specifically on pages 
28 and 29, there is no evidence to substantiate that and quite 
frankly personal attacks have no place in the judicial system and 
clearly not in an appellate brief. 
With respect to plaintiff's attorney citing Rule 3.4 of the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorney's which in essence 
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provides that an attorney shall not "unlawfully obstruct another's 
parties access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal 
a document or other material having potential evidentiary value." 
It is clear that this did not take place. Mr. Durbano and Mr. 
Johnson had every opportunity to contact Mr. Kennedy. They in fact 
did contact him and in Mr. Johnson's presence made the changes to 
the sworn statement. This was a sworn statement and there is no 
rule that states that a party cannot take a statement of an 
eyewitness in the form and manner which was done in this case, 
under oath and in the presence of a court reporter. There is 
absolutely not one shred of evidence that there was any undue 
influence and quite frankly the character assassination does not 
belong in this appellate brief and is not worth the time 
addressing. 
Finally, the standard of review with respect to the 
admissibility of evidence such as the statement of Donald Kennedy 
is that "deference is given to the trial courts advantageous 
position; thus, that court's ruling regarding admissibility will 
not be overturned unless it clearly appears that the lower court 
was in error." Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d 
920, 923 (Utah 1990). It is clear that the lower court's finding 
that the statement of Donald Kennedy was not a deposition but a 
statement and could be used as a prior inconsistent statement to 
impeach was an appropriate ruling. It is also clear that the court 
would only allow the statement for impeachment purposes. Further, 
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plaintiff had a copy of the sworn statement, had talked to Mr. 
Kennedy, had been there at the time the changes were made and could 
have elected not to call Mr. Kennedy as a witness which would have 
precluded the use of the sworn statement. Defendant had absolutely 
nothing to do with plaintiff's decision to call Mr. Kennedy. 
Defendant does have the right, however, to attack the credibility 
of the witness and by definition this will be prejudicial to the 
plaintiff's case. 
Therefore, it appears that the trial court ruled appropriately 
in allowing the sworn statement of Donald Kennedy to be used as a 
prior inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes. It follows 
then that there was no reversible error and plaintiff is not 
entitled to a new trial. 
V. 
FILING A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL IS GROUNDS FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. 
This appeal is frivolous, therefore defendant is entitled to 
costs plus reasonable attorney's fees. Rule 33(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure state that attorney's fees may be 
awarded when the "motion made or appeal taken under these rules is 
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which 
may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing party. The court may 
order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's 
attorney." 
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Utah Rules of Appellate, Rule 33(b) defines a frivolous appeal 
as follows: 
. . .A frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or 
other paper is one that is not grounded in 
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, 
modify or reverse existing law. An appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any 
improper purpose such as to harass, cause 
needless increase in the cost of litigation, 
or gain time that will benefit only the party 
filing the appeal, motion, brief or other 
paper. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 40(a) also defines a 
frivolous appeal as one having no reasonable legal or factual 
basis. Rule 40(a) states: 
Every motion, brief, and other paper of a 
party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record who 
is an active member in good standing of the 
Bar of this state. The attorney shall sign 
his or her individual name and give his or her 
business address, telephone number and Utah 
State Bar number. . . . The signature of an 
attorney or party constitutes a certificate 
that the attorney or party has read the 
motion, brief, or other paper; that to the 
best of his or her knowledge, information, and 
belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is 
not frivolous or interposed for the purpose of 
delay as defined in Rule 33. . . . If a 
motion, brief, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the authority and the 
procedures of this court provided by Rule 33 
shall apply. 
The court in O'Brien v. Rush. 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Ut. App. 
1987) determined that "[a]n appeal brought for delay is one marked 
by dilatory conduct or conduct designed to mislead the court and 
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which benefits only the appellant." 
Further, Black's Law Dictionary 601 (5th Edition 1979) defines 
a frivolous appeal as "[o]ne in which no justiciable question has 
been presented and appeal is readily recognizable as devoid of 
merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed." 
Defendant need only raise this issue in his brief and this 
will constitute notice. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 
1990). 
The court in Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Ut. App., 
1988) recognized that "sanctions for frivolous appeals should only 
be applied in egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling 
of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions. However, 
sanctions should be imposed when "an appeal is obviously without 
any merit and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood of 
prevailing, and results in delayed implementation of the judgment 
of the lower court; increased costs of litigation; dissipation of 
the time and resources of the Law Court." 
The court in Hunt v. Hurst, Supra, addressed the effect 
sanctions would have in filing appeals. In this regard the court 
stated: 
We do not believe or intend that the 
litigation of new or uncertain issues will be 
chilled by imposing sanctions on attorneys who 
pursue what in reality are nuisance claims and 
do so in an unlawyer-like fashion by writing 
an unprofessional brief and relying on 
improper materials and arguments in the brief. 
Id. 417 
* 
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Applying the above analysis to this case it is clear that 
plaintiff has filed an appeal that is without merit, specifically, 
to harass defendant and defense counsel and to prevent the 
implementation of the judgment of the lower court. Further, it is 
clear that plaintiff has prepared her brief in an unlawyer-like 
fashion by "writing an unprofessional brief and relying on improper 
materials and argument in the brief." 
Specifically, plaintiff alleged in Point I of her brief that 
the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. This being 
the case plaintiff had a duty to marshall the evidence. Plaintiff 
failed to do so. Plaintiff has cited from the record but has not 
pointed to particular sections or line numbers in support of her 
contentions, or demonstrated to the court the inferences that can 
be drawn. In addition, she has failed to show the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the verdict entered. Defendant refers you 
to his brief, Statement of Facts, where such evidence has in fact 
been demonstrated to show that the evidence does properly support 
the verdict. In Point II of Plaintiff's brief he argues that it 
was prejudicial not to include the addition he requested to jury 
instruction 10. However, it was clear that jury instruction 10 in 
subsection (A) as well as jury instruction 9 basically gave the 
very same information. Point III of plaintiff's brief dealt with 
the exclusion of the expert's testimony as to fault. In this 
regard, plaintiff has failed to cite two Utah Appellate Court cases 
on point. Davidson v. Prince, Supra., and Steffensen v. Smith's 
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Management Corp.. Supra. Interestingly, Plaintiff cited Davidson 
v Prince, Supra. in her brief for the purpose of showing the 
standard of review. However, this case was not argued in Point III 
of her brief for the reason it was contrary to her position. 
Davidson v. Prince, Supra. makes it clear that it was proper to 
exclude the testimony of the investigating officer as to fault. 
Finally, plaintiff's conduct under Point IV of his brief is 
particularly egregious. Point IV dealt with the issue of whether 
the statement of Donald Kennedy was in fact a sworn statement or a 
deposition. It is clear that plaintiff has a misconception as to 
what a deposition is. The fact a sworn statement is taken under 
oath and in the presence of a court reporter does not make it a 
deposition. Further, plaintiff cites no case law in support of his 
position. Rather than rely on legal precedent he has behaved in an 
unlawyerly-like fashion by accusing defense counsel of improper 
conduct which is unsubstantiated and is not part of the appellate 
record. His accusations with respect to defense counsel have no 
basis in the judicial system much less in this appellate brief. He 
has clearly behaved in an unprofessional manner and this is 
reflected in Point IV of his brief. 
In sum, then the four issues plaintiff has raised on appeal 
are without merit and were done to specifically harass defendant 
and defense counsel, to increase the cost of litigation, and to 
increase the use of the courts time. 
It is clear from the issues plaintiff has dealt with in her 
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brief that she has in fact filed a frivolous appeal. This being 
the case, defendant now requests that he receive double costs and 
reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the foregoing, defendant Warren Yarnell requests the 
court rule as a general proposition and as a matter of law: 
1. That plaintiff has failed to marshall the evidence and 
show that the evidence and the inferences therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party is insufficient to support 
the verdict. Further, defendant requests that the court find that 
the evidence and the inferences therefrom do in fact support the 
verdict and on this basis plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial; 
2. Jury instruction 10 was not confusing or misleading. Jury 
instruction 10 coupled with jury instruction 9 did in fact contain 
plaintiff's requested jury instruction and therefore there is no 
"reversible error"; 
3. The trial court didn't abuse its discretion in excluding 
the testimony of the investigating officer as to fault; 
4. The statement of Donald Kennedy, was in fact a sworn 
statement and not a deposition. This being the case it is a prior 
inconsistent statement and can be used to impeach and attack the 
credibility of the witness and was appropriately used. 
Finally, defendant Warren Yarnell maintains that this appeal 
is a frivolous appeal designed to harass defendant and defense 
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counsel and requests double costs and attorneys fees. 
In sum, this court should affirm the trial court's decisions 
on all four of the aforementioned issues. Further defendant 
requests the court award him double costs and attorney fees for 
filing a frivolous brief. 
DATED this 4th day of September, 1992. 
^ £ KS. J#/SA_/ 
5ARA L. MAW 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
TINA L. NOONAN, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
WARREN YARNELL, 
DEFENDANT. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
CASE NO. 900901422 
***** 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY 
FOR HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE RONALD O. HYDE, JUDGE, 
SITTING AT OGDEN, UTAH ON THE 18TH DAY OF JUNE 1992. 
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
***** 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: PAUL H. JOHNSON 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: BARBARA L. MAW 
***** 
REPORTED BY DEAN OLSEN 
847 E. 2800 N. 
NORTH OGDEN, UTAH 84414 
WK. 399-8405 HM. 782-3146 
2 
OGDEN, UTAH JUNE 18, 1992 11:00 A.M. 
THE COURT: WHAT IS THIS ONE IN HERE ON NOW? WHAT 
ARE WE DOING? 
MS. MAW: IT'S OUR MOTION TO FORCE THE PLAINTIFF'S 
ATTORNEY TO PAY FOR THE ENTIRE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL. 
AND THEIR MOTION TO MAKE THE — WHAT WE CALL SWORN STATEMENT 
OF DON KENNEDY PART OF THE APPELLANT'S RECORD. AND OUR 
OBJECTION TO THAT MOTION. 
THE COURT: ON WHAT BASIS ARE YOU GOING TO MAKE THEM 
PAY FOR THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE WHOLE TRIAL? 
MS. MAW: THE BASIS FOR MAKING IT IS THEY'RE 
ALLEGING THAT YOU CAN'T BE NEGLIGENT BUT NOT THE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF THE INJURIES. THERE ARE VARIOUS WAYS YOU CAN BE NOT 
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE, ONE OF WHICH IS YOU HAVE NEGLIGENTLY 
CAUSED THE ACCIDENT, BUT NOT BE THE CAUSE OF HER INJURIES THAT 
COULD HAVE PRE-EXISTED OR YOU COULD HAVE NEGLIGENTLY CAUSED 
PART OF THE COLLISION, BUT SHE WAS ~ 
THE COURT: BUT THEY CAN DESIGNATE WHAT THEY'RE 
APPEALING. IF THEY DON'T APPEAL THE WHOLE THING, THEY 
DESIGNATE THE POTION OF IT THEY WANT AND HAVE THAT 
TRANSCRIBED. AND IF IT'S NOT SUFFICIENT, THEN THE SUPREME 
COURT SAYS THAT'S NOT SUFFICIENT. BUT I DON'T KNOW THAT IT'S 
MY DUTY TO TELL THEM THEY GOT TO DO THE WHOLE TRIAL. JUST DO 
THE PORTION OF IT THEY WANT. 
MS. MAW: BECAUSE THEY ALLEGE THAT THE FINDING ON 
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THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM WAS WHAT THEY WERE OBJECTING TO. AND 
THAT'S VERY BROAD-BASED, SAYING THAT YOU CAN'T BE — 
THE COURT: WHEN THEY GO TO THE APPELLATE COURT, THEY 
HAVE TO TAKE WITH THEM SUFFICIENT INFORMATION AND SUFFICIENT 
PORTIONS OF THE TRIAL TO SUBSTANTIATE WHAT THEY'RE TALKING 
ABOUT. BUT I DON'T SEE THAT THEY HAVE TO DO IT ALL. I MEAN, 
THE TRIAL COVERS MANY THINGS OTHER THAN THAT. 
MS. MAW: RIGHT. I — THEN IN THE EVENT THEY DON'T 
WANT IT ALL AND IT'S NEEDED, THEN DEFERENCE IS GIVEN THE TRIAL 
COURT UNDER THE RULE. 
THE COURT: THE TRIAL ITSELF COVERED AN AWFUL LOT 
OTHER THAN JUST YOUR PORTION OF IT THEY'RE APPEALING. 
MS. MAW: BUT I GUESS OUR ARGUMENT IS BASICALLY 
WHEN THEY'RE SAYING THAT YOU CAN'T BE — IF YOU'RE NEGLIGENT, 
YOU HAVE TO BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. THAT'S 
CLEARLY AN ERRONEOUS STATEMENT, BUT WHEN THEY'RE MAKING THAT 
BROAD-BASED STATEMENT SAYING IT'S IMPOSSIBLE FOR MR. YARNELL 
TO HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT BUT NOT BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE, THEN 
THAT LEAVES OPEN A WIDE RANGE AS TO WHAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE 
IS. I MEAN, DID HER INJURIES PRE-EXIST AND, THEREFORE, HE IS 
NEGLIGENT, BUT HE DIDN'T CAUSE HER INJURIES BECAUSE THEY PRE-
EXISTED. WAS HE NEGLIGENT IN CERTAIN BEHAVIOR, BUT SHE 
ULTIMATELY TURNS IN FRONT OF HIM AND CAUSES HER OWN 
ACCIDENTS. SO THAT'S THE — 
THE COURT: I'M SURE THERE ARE, BUT WHEN THEY GET TO 
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THE APPELLATE COURT, IT'S THEIR BURDEN TO SUBSTANTIATE WHAT 
THEY'RE CLAIMING. I DON'T SEE WHERE I'VE GOT ANY POWER OR 
AUTHORITY TO TELL THEM THEY GOT TO ORDER THE TRANSCRIPT FOR 
THE WHOLE TRIAL IF ALL THEY'RE APPEALING IS A PORTION OF IT. 
MS. MAW: WELL, THE PORTION THEY'RE APPEALING FROM, 
THOUGH, INVOLVES THE ENTIRE TRIAL. HOW DO YOU SEPARATE IT 
OUT? THAT'S WHERE I'M HAVING TROUBLE ON THIS SPECIAL VERDICT 
BECAUSE THAT'S PART OF WHAT THEY APPEALED WAS THE SPECIAL 
VERDICT FORM. THAT'S THE ULTIMATE FINDING — 
THE COURT: THAT'S KIND OF BETWEEN THEM AND THE 
APPELLATE COURT, ISN'T IT? THE APPELLATE COURT MAY TELL THEM 
THEY HAVEN'T BROUGHT HERE ENOUGH FOR US TO DETERMINE IT. I 
DON'T SEE — WHAT RULE IS IT THAT SAYS THAT I CAN ORDER THEM 
TO DO THE WHOLE TRIAL, TRANSCRIBE THE WHOLE TRIAL? THE 
REQUIREMENT BASICALLY IS THAT THEY DO SUFFICIENT TO — THEY 
DESIGNATE THE RECORD THAT THEY WANT. 
MS. MAW: OKAY. WELL, DOESN'T RULE 11 OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE — 
THE COURT: BUT WHY DO THEY HAVE TO DO THE WHOLE 
THING? 
MS. MAW: THAT GIVES US THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER HIM 
TO PAY THE ENTIRE — TO HAVE THE COURT ORDER HIM TO ORDER THE 
ENTIRE TRANSCRIPT. 
THE COURT: GOSH, WHAT YOU GOT IS DOCTORS AND YOU 
HAVE A LOT IN HERE THAT WOULD BE VERY EXPENSIVE AND 
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UNNECESSARY. 
MS. MAW: OKAY. IN ANY EVENT, I WOULD LIKE HIM TO 
ORDER ALL THE COPIES OF EVERYTHING THAT TRANSPIRED IN CHAMBERS 
IF HE HASN'T ALREADY ORDERED THAT. MR. JOHNSON INDICATED THAT 
HE HAD ORDERED THAT. 
THE COURT: I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT HE — 
MR. JOHNSON: WE THOUGHT WE HAD, AND WE WOULDN'T OBJECT 
TO THAT. AND IF MR. OLSEN WOULD CHECK AND MAKE SURE, IF 
THERE'S ADDITIONAL IN-CHAMBERS TESTIMONY THAT HASN'T BEEN 
TRANSCRIBED, WE'LL CERTAINLY PAY FOR THAT AND ASK THAT TO BE 
TRANSCRIBED. WE THOUGHT WE HAD ALREADY DESIGNATED THAT. 
MS. MAW: SEE, BUT UNDER THE RULE THAT I WAS 
REFERRING TO, UNDER RULE 11(E), SUBSECTION THREE IT JUST SAYS, 
UNLESS WITHIN TEN DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF SUCH DESIGNATION, THE 
APPELLANT HAS REQUESTED SUCH PARTS AND HAS SO NOTIFIED THE 
APPELLEE, THE APPELLEE MAY WITHIN THE FOLLOWING TEN DAYS 
EITHER REQUEST THE PARTS OR MOVE IN THE TRIAL COURT FOR AN 
ORDER REQUIRING THE APPELLANT TO DO SO. 
SO THAT WOULD HAVE GIVEN YOU THE AUTHORITY IF YOU DEEMED 
IT NECESSARY. 
THE COURT: I DON'T DEEM THE WHOLE TRIAL NECESSARY TO 
APPEAL THE PORTION OF IT. 
MS. MAW: CAN'T ARGUE WITH THAT. I MEAN ~ 
THE COURT: WHAT'S THE OTHER QUESTION? 
MR. JOHNSON: OKAY. THE OTHER MOTION, YOUR HONOR, IS 
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WE HAVE THE ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT OF DONALD KENNEDY THAT SHOWS 
THE CHANGES AND I THINK JUST BY OVERSIGHT WE ASKED — WE 
NEGLECTED TO HAVE THAT PUBLISHED AND PUT IN THE RECORD. 
THE COURT: THIS WAS THAT ONE THAT WAS THE STATEMENT 
THAT THEY OBJECTED TO SO MUCH — 
MR. JOHNSON: RIGHT. 
THE COURT: — BECAUSE SHE WENT OUT AND TOOK A 
STATEMENT, AND YOU KEPT SAYING IT'S A DEPOSITION AND THAT — 
MR. JOHNSON: RIGHT. 
MS. MAW: YES. 
MR. JOHNSON: THIS WAS ALLOWED TO BE USED AT THE TRIAL, 
BUT THE ~ 
THE COURT: THE ONLY USE AT TRIAL WAS AS A PRIOR 
INCONSISTENT STATEMENT THAT COULD BE TAKEN ANYWAY. THEY COULD 
GO OUT AND TAKE IT THEMSELVES. IT COULD BE UNDER OATH. 
DOESN'T HAVE TO BE UNDER OATH — 
MR. JOHNSON: WELL — 
THE COURT: ~ IT'S NOT PART OF THE TOTAL RECORD. 
MR. JOHNSON: ALL WE WANT TO HAVE IT IN THE RECORD FOR 
IS FOR THE APPELLATE COURT TO SEE WHAT THE ACTUAL ~ 
THE COURT: WELL, A PORTION — 
MR. JOHNSON: — DOCUMENT WAS WHAT WAS DONE BECAUSE 
THAT'S WHAT WE'RE OBJECTING TO IS TO ALLOWING IT TO COME IN AT 
ALL UNDER ANY — 
THE COURT: I NEVER ALLOWED THE DOCUMENT TO COME IN, 
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BUT I CERTAINLY ALLOWED HER TO USE IT AS A PRIOR INCONSISTENT 
STATEMENT. 
MR. JOHNSON: RIGHT. BUT OUR CONTENTION — 
THE COURT: ANY PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT ~ 
MR. JOHNSON: OUR CONTENTION IS THAT THE WHOLE — THE 
WHOLE DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A DEPOSITION AND IT WAS TAKEN 
WITHOUT PROPER NOTICE BEING GIVEN. 
THE COURT: I KNOW YOU'RE TAKING THAT POSITION AND 
THAT'S THE POSITION YOU TOOK DURING THE TRIAL AND I, FRANKLY, 
HAVE NEVER UNDERSTOOD IT. IT'S NOT A DEPOSITION. AND THAT'S 
PART OF WHAT WE TOOK IN CHAMBERS, AS I RECALL. WHAT THEY DID 
IS THEY WENT OUT AND THEY TOOK A COURT REPORTER AND TOOK A 
STATEMENT. 
MR. JOHNSON: UNDER OATH. 
THE COURT: WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES THAT MAKE? 
MR. JOHNSON: WELL ~ 
THE COURT: THAT DOES NOT MAKE IT A DEPOSITION. IT 
COULD NOT BE USED AS A DEPOSITION. 
MR. JOHNSON: I UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION ON THIS, BUT I 
THINK THAT THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD HAVE THE — 
THE COURT: THE APPELLATE COURT, IF THEY READ THE 
RECORD, THE PORTIONS OF IT, SHE WOULD HAVE REFERRED TO THAT AS 
A PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT. UNDER RULE 11, IT'S ALLOWED. 
MR. JOHNSON: I UNDERSTAND THAT, BUT UNLESS THE 
APPELLATE COURT HAS THE WHOLE DOCUMENT IN FRONT OF THEM, THEY 
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CAN'T MAKE A DECISION ON OUR ISSUE ON APPEAL BECAUSE THEY 
DON'T KNOW WHAT — WHAT'S THERE. AND WE CAN EITHER MAKE THIS 
MOTION TO THE TRIAL COURT TO HAVE THIS ADDED OR WE CAN — 
WHICH I THINK WAS APPROPRIATE AT THIS POINT IN TIME SINCE — 
THE COURT: I DON'T SEE HOW THIS MAKES ANY 
DIFFERENCE. I DON'T THINK THE APPELLATE COURT'S GOING TO TELL 
YOU IT'S A DEPOSITION BECAUSE IT'S NOT. YOU NEVER TRIED TO 
USE IT AS A DEPOSITION ~ 
MR. JOHNSON: I UNDERSTAND — I UNDERSTAND YOUR ~ YOUR 
POSITION ON THIS, BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE APPELLATE COURT OUGHT 
TO HAVE THE WHOLE DOCUMENT, ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IN FRONT OF THEM 
SO THEY CAN FORM THEIR OPINION. OTHERWISE, ALL THEY HAVE IS 
BITS AND PIECES AND THEY DON'T HAVE THE WHOLE PICTURE. 
THE COURT: PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS SAYS THAT'S 
REALLY ALL YOU NEED IS BITS AND PIECES, ISN'T IT? ALL I ~ 
MR. JOHNSON: IF THAT'S WHAT THEY DECIDE, THAT'S — BUT 
IF THEY DECIDE IT'S A DEPOSITION AND GO WITH OUR POSITION — 
THE COURT: I DON'T KNOW HOW YOU CAN POSSIBLY SAY 
IT'S A DEPOSITION. 
MR. JOHNSON: WELL, I KNOW THAT'S YOUR POSITION, I 
UNDERSTAND THAT'S YOUR POSITION. 
THE COURT: YOU HAVE SOME OBJECTION TO IT? 
MS. MAW: I DON'T WANT THE WHOLE DOCUMENT IN. IT'S 
BEING OFFERED TO PROVE THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER ASSERTED, IT'S 
NOT PART — PRIOR — IT'S A PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT AND 
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THEY DID NOTHING TO OPPOSE THE — 
THE COURT: PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AREN'T 
HEARSAY. 
MS. MAW: NO. THEY'RE USED FOR IMPEACHMENT 
PURPOSES. THEY'RE AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, BUT 
THEY'RE NOT USED — THE PARTS I USED WERE TO IMPEACH BOTH — 
THE COURT: WHICH WAS PERFECTLY PROPER — 
MR. JOHNSON: WELL, YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE OUR ARGUMENT 
IS THE MANNER IN WHICH SHE DID THIS WAS VERY PREJUDICIAL TO 
OUR CASE. 
THE COURT: I THINK WHAT YOU HAVE — 
MR. JOHNSON: BASICALLY IS UNDERMINING THE WHOLE 
PURPOSE OF DISCOVERY AND HAVING A FAIR CHANCE TO GET FAIR 
EVIDENCE. 
THE COURT: IT WASN'T DISCOVERY — 
MR. JOHNSON: I — 
THE COURT: — ALL IT WAS IS A STATEMENT. THAT'S 
WHAT UPSETS DURBANO. YOU OBJECTED TO THERE BEING A COURT 
REPORTER. IF SHE HAD JUST SENT SOMEBODY OUT AND SAID TAKE HIS 
STATEMENT, YOU WOULDN'T BE COMPLAINING ABOUT IT. SHE NEVER 
TRIED TO USE IT — 
MR. JOHNSON: SHE TOOK IT UNDER OATH, THAT MADE A 
DIFFERENCE. 
THE COURT: WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES THAT MAKE? 
MS. MAW: DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE. 
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MR. JOHNSON: WELL, REGARDLESS OF WHAT YOUR POSITION IS 
ON IT, I WANT TO HAVE IT IN FRONT OF THE APPELLATE COURT SO 
THEY CAN MAKE A JUDGEMENT ON IT. 
THE COURT: I GUESS — I GUESS THERE'S NO REASON NOT 
TO. 
MS. MAW: YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO OBJECT TO THAT 
BECAUSE THEY'RE GOING TO USE THAT TO PROVE THE TRUTH OF THE 
MATTER ASSERTED. HE HASN'T SUPPLIED AN AFFIDAVIT — 
THE COURT: WHAT THEY — IF I UNDERSTAND WHAT THEY'RE 
CLAIMING IS THAT IT'S IN EFFECT A DEPOSITION AND THEY WANT TO 
SHOW THEM THAT IT'S A DEPOSITION AND THEY DO THAT BY REASON OF 
THE FACT THAT YOU USED THE REPORTER AND PUT HIM UNDER OATH. 
THAT DOESN'T MAKE IT A DEPOSITION. IF THEY WANT THEM TO SEE 
THE DOCUMENT, WHY COULDN'T THEY LOOK AT THE DOCUMENT? 
MS. MAW: BECAUSE HE SHOULD HAVE — IF HE HAD 
WANTED AT THE TIME OF TRIAL ~ FIRST OF ALL, HE DIDN'T OPPOSE 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE COURT REPORTER WHICH CLEARLY SAYS SHE 
MISTAKENLY ENTITLED IT A DEPOSITION INSTEAD OF A SWORN 
STATEMENT. SO I WANT TO PUT THIS — 
THE COURT: THIS IS ONE OF THE THINGS WE RULED IN 
CHAMBERS, ISN'T IT? 
MS. MAW: RIGHT. 
THE COURT: IT'S NOT A DEPOSITION. 
MS. MAW: IT'S NOT A DEPOSITION. 
MR. JOHNSON: YES. 
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THE COURT: YOU COULD NOT USE IT AS A DEPOSITION. 
MS. MAW: IT SHOULD NOT BE PART OF THE COURT'S 
RECORD BECAUSE IT IS NOT A DEPOSITION. 
MR. JOHNSON: BUT THE FACT THAT YOU RULED ON IT IN 
CHAMBERS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS A DEPOSITION, I THINK 
ENTITLES US TO HAVE IT IN THE RECORD SO THAT THEY CAN SEE THE 
BASIS FOR YOUR RULING. 
MS. MAW: BUT YOU HAVEN'T COME FORWARD AND SHOWN 
THAT IT'S A DEPOSITION. YOU HAVEN'T PUT ONE PIECE OF EVIDENCE 
FORWARD BEFORE THIS COURT TODAY THAT SHOWS THAT'S A DEPOSITION 
OTHER THAN YOUR WORD. 
THE COURT: FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF LETTING THE 
APPELLATE COURT LOOK AT IT, I SEE NO REASON THAT THEY CAN'T 
LOOK AT IT. I DON'T SEE THAT IT'S GOING TO CHANGE ANYTHING. 
YOU'RE NOT GOING TO MAKE IT INTO A DEPOSITION. 
MR. JOHNSON: NO. WELL, WE — WE BELIEVE — 
THE COURT: IF THE APPELLATE COURT MAKES IT INTO A 
DEPOSITION, THEY'LL SURE BE CHANGING THE RULES. 
MR. JOHNSON: WHICH I THINK THERE'S A POLICY ISSUE 
HERE. YOU CONDUCT THIS DISCOVERY AND IF THEY ALLOW THIS TO 
COME IN — 
THE COURT: THEY DIDN'T. IT WASN'T. 
MR. JOHNSON: THEY'RE JUST OPENING UP A WHOLE— 
THE COURT: IT DIDN'T COME IN. SHE USED IT AS A 
PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT. THAT'S THE SOLE AND TOTAL USE 
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SHE USED IT FOR. 
MR. JOHNSON: WELL, I JUST — 
THE COURT: YOU CAN DO THAT, YOU CAN USE ANY 
STATEMENT OF ANY — ORAL, WRITTEN, UNDER OATH, NOT UNDER OATH, 
WHATEVER. SO LONG AS IT'S A PRIOR STATEMENT. THE FACT THAT 
IT WAS TAKEN UNDER OATH DOES NOT MAKE IT A DEPOSITION. BUT 
LET THEM LOOK AT IT. 
MR. JOHNSON: OKAY. LETS ~ I'LL LET HER LOOK AT IT 
FOR A MINUTE. 
MS. MAW: NO, I DON'T NEED TO LOOK AT IT. I DON'T 
KNOW IF IT'S A DOCUMENT BECAUSE YOU'RE NOT CREDIBLE. BUT 
ANYWAY — 
THE COURT: I'LL LET YOU INCLUDE IT SO THEY CAN TAKE 
A LOOK AT IT. I DON'T SEE ANYTHING WRONG WITH THAT. 
MS. MAW: YOUR HONOR, WILL YOU ORDER HIM TO HAVE 
THIS PROCEEDING TRANSCRIBED — 
MR. JOHNSON: OH, SURE. 
MS. MAW: ~ AS WELL? 
THE COURT: THAT WAS EASY. 
MR. JOHNSON: OKAY. THAT'S FINE. 
MS. MAW: IT'S USED NOT — 
THE COURT: SEE THE CLERK HERE. 
MS. MAW: YOUR HONOR, I WANT A POINT OF 
CLARIFICATION. IT'S ONLY TO BE USED ~ YOU'RE RULING IT'S 
ONLY TO BE USED TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT'S A DEPOSITION OR A 
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HE WANTS THEM TO LOOK AT IT TO SEE WHAT 
RIGHT. 
IF IT WAS A DEPOSITION, IT WAS A 
WE TAKE THE POSITION IT WAS NOT. JUST 
YEAH. 
AND OTHER THAN THAT — 
— YOU'RE NOT INTERESTED IN WHAT THE REST 
SWORN STATEMENT? 
THE COURT: 
IT IS. 
MR. JOHNSON: 
THE COURT: 
DEPOSITION. 
MS. MAW: 
FOR THAT LIMITED PURPOSE — 
MR. JOHNSON: RIGHT. 
THE COURT: 
MR. JOHNSON: 
THE COURT: 
OF IT IS. 
MR. JOHNSON: OTHER THAN THAT THE ONLY THING THAT WOULD 
BE IN THE RECORD IS — ARE THE ACTUAL PARTS THAT WERE READ 
INTO THE RECORD AT TRIAL, IS THAT RIGHT? 
THE COURT: IT WAS NEVER READ INTO THE RECORD OTHER 
THAN DIDN'T YOU MAKE ~ 
MR. JOHNSON: SHE REFERRED TO IT IN — 
THE COURT: SURE SHE DID, THAT'S TRUE-
MR. JOHNSON: — IN CROSS-EXAMINATION — 
THE COURT: — AS A PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT, 
WHICH SHE HAS A RIGHT TO DO. 
MR. JOHNSON: I BELIEVE YOU GAVE IT TO THE COURT 
REPORTER SO HE COULD GET IT VERIFIED, WHAT THOSE QUESTIONS 
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WERE OR THE STATEMENTS FROM I T , SO — 
THE COURT: YOU GUYS ARE FIGHTING THIS TOOTH AND 
NAIL — 
MS. MAW: WHY, I DON'T KNOW. 
MR. JOHNSON: OKAY. 
MS. MAW: OKAY. THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. JOHNSON: I GUESS I PREPARE THE ORDER. 
THE COURT: UH-HUH. 
MR. JOHNSON: OKAY. 
MS. MAW: MAKE SURE YOU PUT THE LIMITED PURPOSE IN 
THERE. OTHERWISE, I WON'T SIGN THE ORDER. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MS. MAW: THANK YOU. 
MR. JOHNSON: YEAH, WELL, JUST LET ME CLARIFY, BARBARA, 
THE ONLY REASON WE WANT IT IN THERE IS TO LET — ALLOW THE 
APPELLATE COURT TO SEE WHAT JUDGE HYDE RULED ON WHEN HE WAS IN 
CHAMBERS AND MADE A RULING — 
THE COURT: AND THAT'S WHAT WE SAID. THEY CAN PUT IT 
IN FOR THE PURPOSE SO THEY CAN SEE WHAT IT IS WE'RE TALKING 
ABOUT. 
MR. JOHNSON: OKAY. THANK YOU. 
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CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF WEBER) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 14 PAGES OF 
5 I TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE 
6 PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY AS A 
7
 CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH. 
8 DATED AT OGDEN, UTAH THIS 29TH DAY OF JUNE 1992. 
DEAN C. OLSEN 
Tab 2 
Utah Code Ann- §41-6-49: 
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations. 
(1) A person may not operate a motor vehicle at a speed so 
slow as to impede or block the normal and reasonable 
movement of traffic except when: 
(a) reduced speed is necessary for safe 
operation; 
(b) upon a grade; or 
(c) in compliance with official traffic 
control devices. 
(2) Operating a motor vehicle on a controlled access 
highway at less than the lawful maximum speed side by 
side with and at the same speed as a vehicle operated 
in the adjacent right lane constitutes evidence of 
impeding or blocking normal movement of traffic. 
(3) When the Department of Transportation or local 
authorities within their respective jurisdictions determine 
on the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation 
that slow speeds on any part of a highway consistently 
impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, the 
Department of Transportation or local authority may 
determine and shall post a minimum speed limit below which 
no person may operate a vehicle except when necessary for 
safe operation. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-55: 
41-6-55. Overtaking and passing vehicles proceeding in 
same direction. 
The overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding in 
the same direction is subject to the following 
provisions: 
(1) The operator of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle 
proceeding in the same direction shall pass to the left at a 
safe distance and may not again drive to the right side of 
the roadway until safely clear of the overtaken vehicle. 
(2) The operator of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to 
the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle and may not 
increase the speed of his vehicle until completely passed by 
the overtaking vehicle. 
(3) On a highway having more than one lane in the same 
direction, the operator of a vehicle traveling in a left 
1 
lane shall, upon being overtaken by another vehicle in the 
same lane, yield to the over-taking vehicle by moving safely 
to the right, and may not impede the movement or free flow 
of traffic in a left lane except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another 
vehicle proceeding in the same direction; 
(b) when preparing to turn left; 
(c) when reasonably necessary in response to 
emergency conditions; 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33 
Rule 33: Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; 
recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. 
Except in a first appeal of right in a 
criminal case, if the court determines that a 
motion made or appeal taken under these rules 
is either frivolous or for delay, it shall 
award just damages, which may include single 
or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the 
prevailing party. The court may order that 
the damages be paid by the party or by the 
party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these 
rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or 
other paper is one that is not grounded in 
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, 
modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for 
any improper purpose such as to harass, cause 
needless increase in the cost of litigation, 
or gain time that will benefit only the party 
filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other 
paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon 
request of any party or upon its own motion. 
A party may request damages under this rule 
only as part of the appellee's motion for 
summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's 
2 
response to a motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the 
motion of the court, the court shall issue to 
the party or the party's attorney or both an 
order to show cause why such damages should 
not be awarded. The order to show cause 
shall set forth the allegations which form 
the basis of the damages and permit at least 
ten days in which to respond unless otherwise 
ordered for good cause shown. The order to 
show cause may be part of the notice of oral 
argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom 
damages may be awarded, the court shall grant 
a hearing. 
4. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 34. 
Rule 34. Award of costs. 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise 
provided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, 
costs shall be taxed against the appellant 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties or 
ordered by the court; if a judgment or order 
is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against 
appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a 
judgment or order is reversed, costs shall be 
taxed against the appellee unless otherwise 
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed 
or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs 
shall be allowed as ordered by the court. 
Costs shall not be allowed or taxed in a 
criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. 
In cases involving the state of Utah or any 
agency or officer thereof, an award of costs 
for or against the state shall be at the 
discretion of the court unless specifically 
required or prohibited by law. 
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, 
bonds and other expenses on appeal. The 
following may be taxed as costs in favor of 
the prevailing party in the appeal: the 
actual costs of a printed or typewritten 
brief or memoranda and attachments not to 
3 
exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs 
incurred in the preparation and transmission 
of the record, including costs of the 
reporter's transcript unless otherwise 
ordered by the court; premiums paid for 
supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights 
pending appeal; and the fees for filing and 
docketing the appeal. 
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. 
When costs are awarded to a party in an 
appeal, a party claiming costs shall, within 
15 days after the remittitur is filed with 
the clerk of the trial court, serve upon the 
adverse party and file with the clerk of the 
trial court an itemized and verified bill of 
costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days 
of service of the bill of costs, serve and 
file a notice of objection, together with a 
motion to have the costs taxed by the trial 
court. If there is no objection to the cost 
bill within the allotted time, the clerk of 
the trial court shall tax the costs as filed 
and enter judgment for the party 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 40. 
Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; 
sanctions and discipline. 
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every 
motion, brief, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by 
at least one attorney of record who is an 
active member in good standing of the Bar of 
this state. The attorney shall sign his or 
her individual name and give his or her 
business address, telephone number, and Utah 
State Bar number. A party who is not 
represented by an attorney shall sign any 
motion, brief, or other paper and state the 
party's address and telephone number. Except 
when otherwise specifically provided by rule 
or statute, motions, briefs, or other papers 
need not be verified or accompanied by 
affidavit. The signature of an attorney or 
party constitutes a certificate that the 
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attorney or party has read the motion, brief, 
or other paper; that to the best of his or 
her knowledge, information, and belief, 
formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not 
frivolous or interposed for the purpose of 
delay as defined in Rule 33. If a motion, 
brief, or other paper is not signed as 
required by this rule, it shall be stricken 
unless it is signed promptly after the 
omission is called to the attention of the 
attorney or party. If a motion, brief, or 
other paper is signed in violation of this 
rule, the authority and the procedures of the 
court provided by Rule 33 shall apply. 
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and 
parties. The court may, after reasonable 
notice and an opportunity to show cause to 
the contrary, and upon hearing, if requested, 
take appropriate action against any attorney 
or person who practices before it for 
inadequate representation of a client, 
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a 
person allowed to appear before the court, or 
for failure to comply with these rules or 
order of the court. Any action to suspend or 
disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall 
be referred to the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee of the State Bar for proceeding in 
accordance with the Rules of Discipline of 
the State Bar. 
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This 
rule shall not be construed to limit or 
impair the court's inherent and statutory 
contempt powers. 
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An 
attorney who is licensed to practice before 
the bar of another state or a foreign country 
but who is not member of the Bar of this 
state, may appear, upon motion, pro hac vice. 
Such attorney shall associate with an active 
member in good standing of the Bar of this 
state and shall be subject to the provisions 
of this rule and all other rules of appellate 
procedure. 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704 
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue. 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this 
article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an 
oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal 
conduct of a person, if it is intended by him 
as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a 
person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered 
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A 
statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness: The 
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
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and is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement and the statement is 
(A) inconsistent with his testimony or the 
witness denies having made the statement or 
has forgotten, or (B) consistent with his 
testimony and is offered to rebut an express 
or implied charge against him of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive, 
or (C) one of identification of a person made 
after perceiving him; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The 
statement is offered against a party and is 
(A) his own statement, in either his 
individual or a representative capacity, or 
(B) a statement of which he has manifested 
his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a 
statement by a person authorized by him to 
make a statement concerning the subject, or 
(D) a statement by his agent or servant 
concerning a matter within the scope of his 
agency or employment, made during the 
existence of the relationship, or (E) a 
statement by a coconspirator of a party 
during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
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